A UK government scheme to establish nationality through DNA testing is scientifically flawed, ethically dubious and potentially damaging to science.
U ntil a few years ago, the genetic variation of humans was understood only in terms of superficial characteristics, such as hair and skin colour. Today, thanks to the advent of cheap, fast genetic sequencing and DNA-microarray technologies, population geneticists can chart such variations in a more systematic way. Yet most experts agree that these studies are still in their infancy.
So it was with understandable incredulity that researchers received a plan by the UK Border Agency to use genetics to determine nationality -specifically, the origin of asylum-seekers claiming to be from war-torn Somalia. The agency's pilot programme, which began last month, aims to determine whether some 100 individuals really are Somali nationals by checking them for the individual DNA variants known as single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) in mitochondrial DNA, on the Y chromosome and elsewhere in the genome. The scheme will also use isotopic ratios of elements found in hair and fingernails -which can vary depending on a person's diet or environment -to try to establish where the migrants previously lived.
The border agency says that the project has undergone scientific peer review, although it is difficult to say by whom: several geneticists contacted by Nature saw a preliminary proposal from the UK government in 2007, and warned that it was unlikely to work.
It is true that the recent development of large SNP databases have made it possible to determine the geographic origins of Europeans to within a few hundred kilometres (see Nature 456, 98-101; 2008) . But comparable data on many human populations, especially in regions such as Africa, remain patchy at best, and it is unclear what data the border agency will use to establish the origins of these particular asylum-seekers.
On a more fundamental level, the idea that genetic variability follows man-made national boundaries is absurd. Cross-border migration is common throughout the world; Y-chromosome analysis can easily be thrown off by a distant male ancestor; and SNP-based identifications are inexact to say the least. As an example of this last point, individuals whose parents come from two geographic regions are often classed into a third region from which neither parent originated.
The use of isotopic analysis for identifying nationality is also unproven. Although it may be possible to use isotopic ratios to determine the region in which a person has recently lived, it cannot provide definitive evidence of their origins.
These problems seem to be ignored in the guidelines provided to border agents testing the asylum-seekers. Given the scientific credibility of DNA evidence, it is not difficult to imagine that these agents -who are presumably not geneticists -might place undue weight on results that are, at best, difficult to interpret and, at worst, spurious.
Migration organizations and geneticists alike have been vocal in their protests against the plan, and in response the UK government seems to have backpedalled. In a statement released earlier this week from the Home Office, which runs the border agency, the programme was described as only a proof-of-concept project that would not be used to make decisions about any asylum-seeker. But the government should cancel this scientifically dubious and politically sensitive programme outright. If it is allowed to continue, it could easily lead to a public backlash in the very populations that geneticists need to study to understand human origins and the genetic underpinnings of disease. Geneticists, and indeed all scientists, should decry the plan and make it clear that the science does not support it.
■

Putting DNA to the test
Genetic-testing companies lack regulation, and a list of guiding principles does not go far enough.
T he availability of affordable, direct-to-consumer genetic tests has mushroomed, leaving regulation lagging behind. Dozens of companies now offer inexpensive home kits that allow people to spit into tubes, send the samples for DNA analysis and receive a report that allegedly details their ancestry or their possible susceptibility to a long list of disorders that have been linked -often tenuously -to particular genes. But the value of these tests remains debatable, which is why the industry needs a strong set of quality standards and codes of conduct to protect both its consumers and its own credibility.
The UK Human Genetics Commission (HGC) took a welcome step in that direction last month when it issued a set of principles to help guide consumers and to promote high standards and consistency among personal-genomics providers. But the HGC's guiding principles -which are under public review until early December -focus largely on reining in companies' promotional messages so that they reflect the limited utility of genetic testing, and to make would-be customers more aware of what they can realistically expect to learn from the tests. Most DNA testing companies say they are already doing just that, emphasizing that what they provide is information, not medical diagnoses.
The question is what happens if or when prices drop further and the tests become more popular. They are already being marketed over the Internet with little oversight, and it seems likely that increasing numbers of people will be turning to personal-genomics companies in search of definitive answers about how to improve or safeguard their health. But the available answers are rapidly becoming less definitive: the ever-increasing number of genome-wide association studies, which provide a major portion of the genetic markers for disease risks, offer results that even researchers can find hard to interpret, and often flag up markers that are not the most useful predictors of complex traits (see page 712). This means that customers will frequently receive results telling them only that they face the ambiguous possibility of a somewhat elevated risk of a little-understood disorder. Presumably, most customers in that position will simply be more vigilant about disease screening. But if the ambiguous, slightly elevated risk relates to a frightening condition such as breast cancer, some individuals might feel compelled to undertake drastic and perhaps needless measures, such as prophylactic mastectomy.
The HGC's principles, if adopted, should help to minimize such panic reactions. For example, the HGC advocates that genetic counselling be provided both before and after testing for serious hereditary diseases. But there is room to go further and, on page 724, Craig Venter and his colleagues offer nine recommendations for how to do so. For example, Venter's team urges companies to agree on a core set of non-ambiguous genetic markers -ones that put a carrier at high risk of developing a specific condition. Companies would be well-advised to follow this recommendation, as such an agreement would help to avoid conflicting messages and inconsistent results across the industry.
Ultimately, however, government regulators may feel compelled to step in on the grounds that industry self-policing no longer offers consumers adequate protection. The US Food and Drug Administration has already recruited bioethicist Alta Charo, in part to advise commissioner Peggy Hamburg on a comprehensive approach to regulating these tests.
Government regulators should proceed with care, given the dizzying speed at which the science of personalized genomics is advancing. But in the interim, DNA-test providers should up their game by providing only clinically useful information and spelling out exactly how much biology remains unknown.
■
How to win trust over flu
Mass-vaccination campaigns for the pandemic H1N1 virus must take public concerns into account.
A s countries roll out their campaigns for large-scale vaccination against pandemic H1N1 flu, a poll released last week by the Harvard School of Public Health in Boston, Massachusetts, found that only four in ten US adults have definitely decided to get vaccinated themselves, and just half plan to get the shot for their children (go.nature.com/wiB8V3). Harvard's results parallel those from other surveys, both inside and outside the United States, all of which suggest that many people are still dubious about the vaccine. Public-health authorities, who are keen to contain the pandemic's spread, need to realize that their best hope of dealing with such public reluctance is to patiently address the concerns that underlie it.
Sometimes, it's true, those concerns go beyond any appeal to reason. They grow out of a visceral mistrust of authority in general -and of government, regulatory agencies, medical researchers and multinational pharmaceutical companies, in particular. A sophisticated anti-vaccine movement has emerged that plays on this wariness, and helps to feed the conspiracy theories about the H1N1 vaccine that are circulating on the Internet and in viral e-mails.
But far more often, say researchers who have studied this subject, people are assessing vaccination through a perfectly rational costbenefit analysis. There is a widespread public perception, for example, that the vaccine's safety trials have been rushed -the Harvard study found that possible side effects were respondents' main concern -and that H1N1 flu is mild. As a result, many feel no urgent need to be vaccinated, preferring to hold off until they see how the first phases of the vaccination programme go. Indeed, the Harvard poll also found that some 60% of those who don't intend to get a shot are open to changing their mind if people in their community become severely ill or die.
Such deliberations reflect a perfectly legitimate decision-making process, says Peter Sandman, a risk-communication consultant in Princeton, New Jersey. And governments, he advises, should frame their public-education campaigns in ways that respect people's judgement and their wait-and-see attitude.
Research in risk communication strongly shows that when over-eager officials pressure members of the public who are already sceptical and ambivalent, while being openly dismissive of public concerns, they only end up stoking resistance. Instead, officials should focus on providing people with the information they need to make good choices for themselves. This should include reminders that coincidences do happen: in any massvaccination campaign, at least a few people will fall ill immediately after receiving their shot for reasons that have nothing to do with the vaccine -a possibility vividly highlighted last week by the death of a 14-year-old British girl hours after receiving a vaccine against human papilloma virus. Regulatory authorities need to better explain the extensive safety tests that vaccines undergo and, at the same time, build confidence by being utterly transparent in the reporting and investigation of any suspect events linked to vaccination.
The public-education campaign should also correct the misconception that H1N1 flu is mild. It is mild in most who catch it. But for those individuals -mainly young adults -who will develop the severe form, H1N1 is life-threatening. Moreover, because the virus is new and immunity is lacking, many more people will get it than is typical for seasonal flu, and the toll of serious illness and deaths will accordingly be that much higher.
Finally, people should be reminded that vaccination isn't just about protecting themselves; it's also about not spreading the flu to others, which, importantly, alleviates pressure on overstretched hospitals. Campaigns should give altruistic appeals far more prominence than they typically have in the past; research shows that they can be surprisingly effective.
More generally, for officials and researchers at all levels, the scepticism over the pandemic vaccine should serve as a timely reminder of the imperative to work to gain greater public trust in science-based advice and in those who give it.
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